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The roots of e
Egypt in the aftermath of the 25th 
revolution 
 
by Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim*
 
Introduction 
 
Since the 25
th
of January 2011 revolution
fronts. Almost all the economic indicators have been pointing towards a deteriorating situation, 
and in many cases have reached the trough. Yet,
due to the unprecedented support of some of Arab Gulf countries, who
helped to mitigate the deteriorating economic conditions.  
 
The economic challenges fa
revolution mainly because of the deteriorating political and security conditions which have 
interrupted the functioning of the economy. Yet, this is not to say that revolution has caused 
these challenges. In fact, the challenges that the Egyptia
roots in its socio-political-economic context, which this paper aims 
and its aftermath have brought to the forefront challenges which have always
by short-term solutions that never dealt seriously with the
has brought additional problems associated with the macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, 
the challenges became more complex especially in light of the need to balance the social and 
economic aspects.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows; in section one we pinpoint the main challenges faced by Egypt 
where we identify the symptoms and causes of such challenges. In section two we discuss the 
roots of such challenges. Finally, we conclude and 
expected to face its challenges in the near future
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conomic challenges f
 
, the Egyptian economy has been suffering on all 
 the economy is still surviving.
se
 
cing Egypt have been exacerbated after the 25
n economy has been facing have deep 
to explain. The revolution 
ir roots. Moreover,
provide our understanding of how Egypt 
. 
 
4 
acing 
 This is mainly 
 unconditional aid has 
th
 of January 
 been mitigated 
 the revolution 
is 
 Section One: Challenges Facing the Egyptian Economy
Despite the deeply rooted economic problems, the former 
January 2011 was able to keep the macroeconomic balances under control. Over the period 
2004-2010 the Egyptian economy 
some years, the budget deficit was in the range of 8
balance of payments had been 
increasing. Moreover, foreign direct investment (FDI) ha
billion US$). In fact, Egypt was appraised by international organizations for it
economic performance, which according to their standards has been improving over time. For 
example, Egypt was considered 
(2008), for improving in 5 of the 10 areas 
performance was not reflected in improv
level of poverty remained high and income distribution did not improve. In other words, the 
governing regime before the 25 of January revolution focused mainly on the economic aspects 
while leaving the social aspect
 
Poverty in Egypt has remained high and vulnerable to changes in GDP growth rates. 
2009, it was estimated that almost 21% of the population (approximately 13.5 million) was 
below the national poverty line (
much since the early 1990s, where at that time 24% of the population fell below the national 
poverty line.
3
 Yet, according to World Bank (2009)
compared to 2004/2005 as reflected in the incidence of poverty
slightly increased as well as the severity of poverty.
revolution, poverty levels have increased significantly, mainly due to the dramatic s
growth rates, a significant increase in unemployment rates, 
(table 1). According to data issued by the 
(CAPMAS), Egypt's poverty increased to encompass 25.2 % of the population in 2010/2011 
compared to 21.6% in 2008/2009
in 2010/2011 from 6.1% in 2008/2009. These figures are 
line in Egypt, which is estimated at LE256
"extreme" poverty line is calculated at LE171.5 per person per month or LE5.7 per day
 
 
                                                          
1
 World Bank (2008).  
 
2
 World Bank (2009) puts the figure of poor in Egypt at 28 million people in 2005 representing 40% of the 
population. World Bank (2009) considers 13.6 million (19.6%) in absolute poverty or ultra
than the minimum to cover their basic food 
million (21%) in near poverty (spending between LE 1424 and 1854 per year per capita).
 
3
 UNDP (2010). 
 
4
 World Bank (2009). 
5
 Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
 
regime in power up to the 
was just doing perfect, with growth rate
-10% and was heavily controlled, 
turned into a surplus, and foreign exchange reserves were 
d reached unprecedented levels (13 
as the “top reformer” in 2006/2007 by 
assessed by the Report.1 Yet, 
ements in the socio economic indicators, where the 
 relatively untouched.   
LE120 per capita per month).2 The situation 
,
4
 the poverty situation improved in 2008 
, whereas the poverty gap 
 In the aftermath of the 25
and the unstable political situation
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
. ”Extreme” poverty had decreased to 4.8% of the population 
calculated according to the pover
 per person per month, or LE8.5 per day, while the 
requirements or less than LE 1423 per year per capita) and 14.5 
(2012). 
 
5 
25 of 
s exceeding 7% in 
the 
s remarkable good 
Doing Business Report 
this good economic 
By February 
had not changed 
th of January 
lowdown in 
 
ty 
.5 
-poverty (spending 
 
 Table 1: Poverty Rate in Different Years
 
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line  
(% of population) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators 
 
The 25 of January revolution pointed out the need 
which was neglected to a large extent by the former regime. The slog
been “bread, freedom, and social justice”. Hence, the different 
revolution have leaned towards achieving the social goals, in many cases at the expense of the 
economic stability. As a result, the challenges 
achieving social goals and economic 
challenges have been solved. The macroeconomic indicators have been deteriorating
aftermath of the revolution and it is clearly that it has 
been revealed by the deteriorating economic indicators (slowdown of the economy where 
growth rate went down from 5.9% in 2009/2010 to 1.9% in 2010/2011 (CBE, 2011)
unemployment reaching higher 
from 6.6 billion US $ in 2009/2010 to 2.2 billion US $ in 2010/2011 with a negative growth rate 
of 67% (figure 2).   
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Egypt over the Period 2008
Indicator 
GDP growth (annual %) 
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Total reserves in months of imports
Total Unemployment (% of total 
labor force) 
State Budget Cash Deficit (% of GDP)
Total reserves (% of total external 
debt) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, available online at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worl
d-development-indicators 
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 Central Bank of Egypt Annual Report 2010/2011 (2011).
 
 
2000 2005 2008 2009
16.7 19.6 - 21.6
available online at: 
of paying attention to 
an of the revolution has 
regimes that f
were exacerbated, where the conflict between 
objectives became so intense, and in fact none of the 
negatively affected the economy as has 
and alarming rates (figure 1), and the decline in 
Egypt 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 
 -0.9 -1.8 -2.1 -2.4 
 6.0 7.4 6.7 3.3 
8.7 9.4 9.0 12 
 -6.4 -6.6 -7.7 -10.1 
102.5 99.8 101.7 53.2 
 18.3 11.8 11.3 10.1 
 
  
 
6 
 2011 
 25.2 
 
the social dimension 
ollowed after the 
 in the 
the 
6
 (table 2), 
net FDI inflows 
-2011 
  
Figure 1: Unemployment Rate (%)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF),  World Economic Outlook Database, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.asp
 
Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series
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The 2010/2011 deficit in the 
billion US $ (4.1% of GDP) compare
whereas international reserves slipped down from 36 billion US dollars in January 2011 
(covering more than 8 month of imports) to 16 billion US dollars in January 2012 (covering less 
than 4 months of imports) (see figures 3 and 4
prospects for the future are worrisome
rating for Egypt by major rating agencies has deteriorated several times since 
the revolution causing additional problems with the ability of Egypt to borrow from abroad 
result of its declining credit worthiness. 
increased by almost 2 percentage points making it more burdensome for the government to 
borrow. The government’s overall
pounds (23 billion US $), representing around 10% of GDP, and not including foreign and 
domestic debt service which reached 99 billion US$. T
GDP, foreign reserves have been declining significantly, black market in foreign exchange 
appeared despite devaluation taking place, 
deficit, etc. The economic outlook is extremely gloomy. Figures 1 and 2 show how the bud
deficit and balance of payments have deteriorated significantly.
 
Figure 3: Balance of Payments
US Billion 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series
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balance of payments reached unprecedented heights scoring 9.8 
d to a surplus of 3.4 billion US $ (1.5% of GDP) in 2009/2010, 
). Tourism receipts declined significantly and 
 due to the worsening security situation. The credit 
Due to this situation, the interest rate on treasury bills 
7
 budget deficit reached high records of 142 billion Egyptian 
he budget deficit soared to almost 14% of 
the balance of payments turned from surplus to 
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Figure 4: Net International Reserves
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Publications, Statistical Bulletin, January 2014. 
http://cbe.org.eg/CBE_Bulletin/2014/Bulletin_2014
al_Reserves_with_CBE.pdf 
 
The balance of payments problems hinge mainly on declining foreign exchange receipts 
tourism, exports and, FDI. Other sources of foreign exchange as remittances and Suez Canal 
revenues which have maintained their levels and ev
relative scarcity of foreign exchange has had a negative impact on the exchange rate (figure 5). 
However, the devaluation that took place in December 2012 was not substantial as
figure 5. Currently, there is a small black market premium which does not exceed 5%, signa
that the Central Bank, so far, is in control of managing the exchange rate, mainly with the 
support of the Gulf countries which reached around 17 bil
till May 1st, 2014. 
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Figure 5: Exchange Rate 
Official exchange rate (Egyptian Pound 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series
 
 
The deteriorating economic conditions have exacerbated the unemployment problem with 
official figures stating the unemployment level 
figure we believe it is underestimated due t
government of  additional waves of job seekers after the 25
 
The two major economic challenges faced by the Egyptian economy (before and after the 
revolution) remain two: the reform of 
 
Subsidies seem to be the major challenge that 
tackle. In fact, subsidies have always represented the symbol of the social contract between the 
governing regime and the population. A
concern, and none of the preceding regimes 
reform measures. Rather, a piecemeal approach (often manipulated in 
was always used when it became
subsidies system.  Otherwise, and as long as the system can be sustained, even if at extremely 
high economic cost, inefficiencies 
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having reached 13%. Despite the relatively high 
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th
 of January revolution. 
subsidies and unemployment. 
all governing regimes in Egypt ha
ny attempt to reform subsidies was always a major 
in the last 60 years was able to implement serious 
 really urgent and pressing to undertake adjustments to the 
and waste of resources, no reform took pla
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 The main cause behind the budget deficit deterioration 
expenditure on increasing public wages (as a response to the demonstrations
subsidies (table 3). 
 
Figure 6: Government Budget
Source: Ministry of Finance, State's General Budget Final Accounts, 
http://www.mof.gov.eg/English/Pages/FinalA
 
Table 3: Distribution of Government Expenditures (%)
 
2005/2006 2006/2007
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Salaries and wages 18.1 
• Purchases of Goods  
• and Services 
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) and energy 
 
 2011/2012 2012/2013 
24.0 26.1 24.3 
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Financial 
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Source: Calculated using data from Central Bank of Egypt, Research and Publications, Time Series, 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Time+Series/
Energy subsidies comprise a significant share of government expenditure in Egypt. In 
2012/2013, petroleum subsidies reache
GDP, 17% of total government expenditure, and 25.4% of total government revenues. 
Petroleum subsidies increased from LE1.2 billion in 1998/1999 to LE100 billion in the 
2012/2013 (figure 7): 
 
Figure 7:  Value of Petroleum Subsidies in Egypt (billion Egyptian Pounds)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Closing Accounts of State Budget, Several Years.
 
As for unemployment, its 
unemployment rate continued to prevail in the 2000s. Moreover, unemployment rates 
increased further after the revolution. The highest unemployment rates have been 
concentrated among youth as well as females. 
reached about 27.2 million by end of the
800,000 new entrants to the labor market 
a growth rate of 6.5-7% per year 
due to inefficient educational and employment policies, among other macroeconomic 
deficiencies, this huge labor force has not been effectively used. In the last two decades the 
growth was driven by specific sectors including telecommunications, financial
estate which has not been necessarily employment enhancing. Manufacturing sectors with high 
value added did not play an effective role in enhancing growth.  
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rate increased significantly in the 1990s. The high average 
Egypt enjoys a large and young labor force 
 
first quarter (January-March
annually  and for enough jobs to be created for them 
for at least two decades is required (Ikram, 2006)
Governmen
, (2013).  
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which 
) of 2013.
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 There are 
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9
 However 
 services and real 
t policies have 
67.7
95.5 100
 failed to deal with the structural problems of the economy, 
chronic. The concentration of the unemployment among youth is another major challenge (22% 
for age bracket 25-29 and 44% for age bracket 20
important driver of growth  has not been utilized and has acted a burden rather than an 
opportunity. Public sector employment, and informal sector helped to alleviate the features of 
the problem, yet the core of the problem 
uprising the problem has worsened and 
from an average of 9.9% for the decade before 2011. 
 
Moreover, youth employment does not improve 
skills and education since it has been hitting all skill levels. Even highly skilled young workers 
have been facing severe challenges in getting a job at their 
been either forced into the informal economy, 
labour market.
11
  
 
The negative consequences of the unemployment problem in terms of proliferation of the 
informal sector and its correlation 
political repercussions, especially in light of the old social contract 
creating jobs is a main role for the
last few years, rising unemployment has been ass
increased dramatically. In 2008 Egypt witnessed around 323 protests and strikes, span
wide social spectrum. It is worth noting that most of these protes
collar circles.
12
 Such protests r
out of a sense of insecurity and/or 
the old social contract, and the inability of the governing regimes 
needs of their population. 
 
In fact the unemployment problem in Egypt has a number of causes on both the supply and 
demand sides. On the supply side, the major problems are associated with the deteriorat
level of education, the mismatc
requirements, and the inflexible labour market policies and regulations. On the demand side, 
the investment and industrial policies adopted were not geared to create job opportunities, 
and this is highly associated with the inefficient energy subsidy scheme which create
wrong incentives encouraging energy and capital intensive industries, rather than labo
intensive ones. 
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 African Development Bank (ADB) (2013).
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 International Labour Organization (ILO), (2013).
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 AL-Ahram Weekly (2009). 
 
and so unemployment remained 
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remained unresolved. In the aftermath of the Arab 
the average rate of unemployment rose to 13% up 
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with higher poverty rates has led to
which 
 stabilization of governing regimes. So much so that 
ociated with protests 
ts came from within blue 
evealed the anger of the unemployed as well as the employed 
in support for higher wages. This signal
to respond
h between educational systems’ outcomes and labour market 
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up the ladder of 
they have 
 not to join the 
 socio-economic and 
confirmed that 
in the 
whose number have 
ning  a 
led the breakdown of 
 adequately to the 
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ur 
 There are other several challenges that are related to the main two chal
unemployment and which account for the 
budget deficit which reached about 17.2% of GDP in 1990/1991, 10.2% in 2001/2002 and 10.7% 
in 2011/2012
13
  and overall balance of payment
2000/2001 reaching 11.3 billion dollars in 2011/2012 representing 0.9% and 4.4% of GDP in the 
previously mentioned years respectively
national debt remains a major concern
debt (external and domestic) by 
 
In the mid-2000s the macroeconomic policies adopted aimed mainly at restoring the 
macroeconomic imbalances. Yet, the inability to
to worsening fiscal situation which was made worse by the wasteful 
economic developments following the aftermath of the 25
significant. The balance of payments turned from a surplus of 3.4 billion US $ in the fiscal year 
2009/2010 to a deficit of 9.8 billion US $ in 2010/2011.The 
new challenge that appeared in 
rose sharply to reach around 40 billion US $ in December, 2012. However, in relative terms the 
external debt remained in the range of 13.8% of GDP by end of December 2012
considered an acceptable range.
 
The improvement of the socio economic situation
explained above the growth performance of the Egyptian economy 
has failed to create sufficient jobs to match the rapid increase in the labo
year. The proliferation of the informal sector has created another type of political and social 
problem to the government. The current predom
impression on the improvement of employment prospects, where in reality the jobs remain 
unproductive and do not have a positive impact on economic growth. Based on recent 
estimates, the informal econo
average 34.9% between 1999 and 2006/2007
outlet for reducing the official unemployment rates, but in fact 
unemployment.  
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s deficit which was about 0.9 billion dollars in 
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 Moreover, the domestic component of the overall 
 and it has represented on average 83.5% of the total
the end of December 2012.
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 tackle the inefficient energy subsidy system led 
food subsidy system
thof January revolution have been 
increase in 
the period following the Presidential elections of 2012 whe
 Yet, the domestic debt has been increasing significantly.
 has also remained a major challenge. As 
from 
inance of the informal sector gives 
my has reached remarkable proportions in Egypt representing on 
.17 The inflated public sector has also acted as an 
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ur force of 2.7% per 
the wrong 
a case of disguising 
Source: 
 Section Two: Explaining the Roots of Economic Challenges:
The picture given that the pre
accumulating foreign reserves, lessening budget deficits, turning balance of payments f
deficits to surpluses, and controlling inflation did not tell the full story Problems were 
proliferating below the surface 
new, but they were either neglected or overlooked by both the governing regime as well as the 
international community. We can identify three main problems in this regard, namely 
unemployment; lack of or inefficient social safety net; and anti
with clear elements of crony capitalism. From a political economy perspective the three 
problems are to a large extent interrelated. Moreover, the developmental model adopted by 
Egypt since the 1960s has also 
model was established by relying heavily on government intervention in the economy with 
social contracts established between the governing autocratic regimes and the society where 
the government is responsible for making jobs, subsidized food 
stability and security.18 In time, and starting the 1990s when the economic situation worsened, 
there was a need for economic reform, which was implemented jointly with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The reform program was based on 
Consensus” type of prescription and the governing regime started to undertake measures to 
liberalize the economy. But such measures failed to allow the private sector to become an 
engine of growth due to the inheritance of bureaucracy, rent seeking activities and th
social contract.  Egypt started to suffer from several structural problems associated with the 
inefficiency of its economy, lack of diversification, and inability to create the type of growth 
that ensures employment generation. As a result, unemploym
significantly and other economic problems started to intensify.  
 
Below we highlight a number of aspects that explain the aforementioned challenges
Inefficient Social Safety Nets 
The governing regimes starting 
population. The subsidies encompassed food as well as energy. 
and throughout the 1970s, these
relatively limited size of the population and the relative closed nature of Egypt
the regime to be shielded from exogenous shocks. With the adoption of the economic reform 
programs in the 1990s the focus of the regimes turned to economic aspects, whereas the social 
considerations were left behind. International organizations have devoted more attention to 
getting macroeconomic balances right, while issues 
safety net were not high on the agenda. The governing regime has focused also on 
macroeconomic indicators and avoided any kind of substantial reform of the social safety nets 
out of fear of the negative political and social repercussions. The inform
substitute for the formal social safety net that should have been provided by the governing 
regimes. This allowed the governing regimes to undertake their necessary economic reform 
measures while ensuring that there 
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-revolution regime was actually achieving 
 before the 25
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 of January revolution. These 
-competitive behavior mixed 
been a major culprit for causing the economic p
and cheap fuel in return 
ent rates started to increase 
 
from the 1960s have provided untargeted subsidies for the 
In the early stages of the 
 untargeted subsidies could have been tolerated due to the 
concerning the efficiency
would be no social unrest.  
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decent growth rates, 
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problems were not 
roblems. The 
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the “Washington 
e old 
 
1960s 
, which enabled 
 of the social 
al sector acted as a 
  
However, in time the cost of subsidies increased dramatically in most, if not all of the
subsidies amounted to around LE95.5 billion in 2011/12, compared to LE60.2 billion in 2007/08, 
recording more than 58.6 percent increase (Ministry of 
been true in the case of food subsidies which recorded more 
the same period, rising from LE16.4 billion to LE30.3 billion. This implies that fuel and food 
subsidies represented more than 20 percent and 6 percent of total budget expenditure in 
2011/12,
19
 which started to affect negatively the fiscal balance.  The quality of public services 
started to deteriorate dramatically, an issue which has not been easily captured by data 
published as for example the 
on health. Such indicators have been misleading
been within the acceptable international norms, the quality aspect was never
same is true for the public expenditure on health and education, where such figures do not 
reveal the expenditure outlays, which in many cases have been channeled to finance 
administrative staff and not technical staff or investments.  The p
sector acted again as a substitute here 
increased significantly, signaling 
services provided by the government and 
contract.  
 
Hence the inefficiency of the social safety net which was not an important issue till the 1990s 
started to become a major problem after 
the inefficiency of the social safety net intensified and the resources devoted to 
public social services did not help to improve the quality of such services or reach th
people. The informal sector and petty corruption provided a substitute for such
social safety net. 
 
Lack of Institutions Necessary to Govern the Market
The governing regimes neglected the necessity of establishing the right instituti
the market (e.g. competition and consumer protection laws), or 
laws which remained on the 
the economic reform program adopted in the 1990s did not focus on this important aspect, 
the emphasis was on economic policies as explained above. 
emerged, namely the desire of the governing dictators to be succeed
members. To achieve this, the 
elements of the private sector to act as a strong lobby for them remaining in power. This led to 
conflict of interest and grand corruption, but
for the regimes (by creating beneficiaries from the succession procedure). Major private sector 
players started to hold legislative and executive positions, which in a country suffering from
lack of clear rules on conflict of interest 
capital. This led to the phenomena of crony capitalism and nepotism, and ultimately led to 
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Finance, Final Accounts). The same has 
than an 84 percent increase over 
number of beds in hospitals per thousand persons or expenditure 
, for whereas the number of beds might have 
roliferation of the informal 
but it carried with it the seeds of petty
at the same time the huge inefficiency of the social public 
pre-announcing the break
the start of economic reforms in the 1990s. By time, 
 
in some cases 
shelf with no enforcement or discretionary 
Subsequently, 
governing regimes increased their dubious ties with the certain 
 served to sustain the necessary political support 
implied a wrong marriage between political power and 
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 captured. The 
 corruption, which 
up of the old social 
the provision of 
e needy 
 an inefficient 
ons to govern 
introduced weak 
enforcement. In fact, 
and 
a new variable 
ed by their family 
 the 
 delay the establishment of the
such agencies which only existed on paper and had no impact at all on the market
gaps widened dramatically in which although 
increase in the overall feeling of 
 
The end result of these economic problems was an increasing loss of trust in the regimes 
among different segments of the population and discontent that the old social contract was no 
longer respected, especially in light of the high unemployment rates among youth.  A mixture 
of anger about the political, economic, and social conditions triggered by the domino effect of 
developments in other Arab countries, together with an inability to handle the protests and 
demonstrations ultimately led to the revolu
What Needs to be Done: Prospects for the Future
Ensuring a long term positive correlation between growth and employment
a number of sectors, and coordination among several policies. There is a need for majo
reforms in the educational system, employment policy and institutional infrastructure to ensure 
that economic growth yields positive impact on employment, unemployment, and poverty. 
There is a need for better coordination among different macroeconomic po
policies. Investment policy needs to be tailored in a way that enhance
with high propensity of generating employment, and a
needed to be designed and implemented. 
employment in the economy (absorbing one third of labo
generating higher value added.
 
Enhancing forward and backward linkages
case of the telecommunications sector), being capital intensive, cannot be altered. However, 
this does not imply that they cannot play a role in enhancing employment. In fact their role in 
increasing labour productivity and the backward and forwar
economy should be used in a way to enhance employment in sectors that are labor intensive.
 
Rationalization of the generous subsidy system: 
important role in acting as a social safety net. In fact such 
food and energy products, has been heavily criticized of being inefficient and 
targeting (in 1992, 86% of the population continued to benefit from subsidy programs). The 
generous subsidy system played an important role especially in light of the declining real wages 
phenomenon that affected all sectors of the economy in the 1990s. Yet the generous subsidies 
are being rationed due to the high burden they impose on the governm
the status of vulnerable groups
framework of the social safety net. 
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 By relative poverty we mean the feeling of the general public that there is a wide gap between their incomes and 
the incomes of specific elites in the country.
 institutions to govern the markets or to the establishment of 
not well captured by formal indicators, 
relative poverty among the public.
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 growth of sectors 
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 other sectors of the 
 
have also played an 
of lacking 
 Enabling the private sector: The 
business environment to improve and in turn help businesses to become the 
growth. In fact, the size of the private sector as 
However, the existing indicators show that 
problems that prevent it from acting as a catalyst of growth and development. Problems 
include the lack of efficient public services, red tape 
sector needs to be enhanced
institutional pillars of a market economy were lately introduced including the competition law 
in 2005 and consumer protection law in 2006
 
Enhancing the role of SMEs 
sectors that enjoy high growth rate but are not necessarily labo
account for 80% of Egypt’s domestic economy and 75% of the private sector’s labo
another unutilized driver of growth
high transaction costs and bureaucracy which have 
Moreover, SMEs have not been integrated in the value 
large enterprises. SMEs cannot be dealt with as one entity as the
sector. SMEs are in need of a holistic 
should be further enhanced to undertake their role in creating productive employment. 
their significant contribution to Egypt’s economy, SMEs receive only 10 percent of available 
banking finance, making it difficult to increase their productivity and output
there is an urgent need to upgrade the labor skills and enhance productivity
training programs that respond to the need of the market.  This requires the adoption of 
demand and supply side policies including labor, investme
 
 
The question that then follows is to what extent are such ills of economics and governance likely 
to be solved in the near future?
The old regimes might have achieved sound macroeconomic indicators, yet in reality it 
several pitfalls. Some have blamed the failure due to adoption of market system, whereas in 
reality the regime did not opt for one. On the contrary, the failure is due to 
implement a proper free market system and prepare well to benefit from integration. As shown 
by Ikram (2006) the size of the public sector to GDP remained extremely high despite the 
announcement of the adoption of liberal policies starting 
sector to GDP reached 50% in the 1980s. A market system implies by default a larger role for 
the government on two fronts, namely social safety net, and proper, well
that govern the market (strong institutions)
in creating an efficient social safety net as well establishing a transparent well enforced 
regulatory system that governs the market. The end result was corruption, widening gaps 
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private sector remains unequipped for the task of 
a percentage of GDP increased over time. 
the business environment suffer
and rent seeking activities. 
 and its existing schemes should be reformed, 
, but the efficiency of these needs to be increased
and strengthening the forward and backward linkages with the 
ur intensive. 
.
21
 Such huge production capacity is suffering 
driven SMEs into the informal sector. 
chain and they do not interact with 
y need to be 
approach, as well as sectoral policies. 
nt, industrial, and trade policies.
 
in the 1970s. The 
. In both cases, there was a clear government failure 
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s from a number of 
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differentiated by 
Moreover, SMEs 
Despite 
.22 In this regard, 
 through tailored 
  
had 
their inability to 
size of the public 
-enforced regulations 
 between income levels, and 
market system and integration in the world economy
which failed to set the needed pre
world economy to function properly. 
 
Egypt is at crossroads, not only from a political point of view, but also on economic and social 
grounds. The 25
th
 of January revolution and its aftermath have shocked Egyptian society. The 
day to day incidents have shown hu
issue that was neither visible 
that extreme after the revolution. The 25
implicit economic factors. The failure of the old regime 
majority of the population, while at the same time supporting the corrupt elite, led to 
extremely high levels of dissatisfaction among the p
people started asking for "bread", "freedom", and "social equity". Those three important 
aspects of a descent life were not provided by the old regime. Hence, it is expected that any 
political power or party, regardless of its economic ideology or religious roots, will need to 
highlight such aspects in its election program in order to fulfill the revolution
goals are translated on the ground in the form of 
unemployment, and ensuring social equity.
 
However, on the ground, there is still a need to create a vision on how the economic system 
should look like. What are the main features of it
religious groups competing for
future of Egypt has been largely neglected by the political powers, yet it is expected to gain 
attention in the remaining phase of the transitional period and afterwards.
 
Bearing in mind the factors discussed above such as th
model of development adopted, as well as the worsening economic indicators in the last two 
years, it seems unlikely that the economic conditions will change in the near future. In fact, and 
because of the structural nature of 
management by the current governing regimes
intensified. The governance challenges are also unlikely to be drastically changed. The only 
change likely to happen is the removal of the old private sector tycoons who were heavily 
engaged with the old regime. But this does not necessarily imply a
conducive to business growth
players will have to be filled and fille
economic conditions, might be forced to revert to 
through other means, either foreign
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a lack of justice.23 But this is not because of adoption of free 
; rather it is because of the government 
-conditions for a market economy and integration in the 
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job creation, fighting corrup
 
, given the wide variety of ideological and 
 their place in the new parliament? Such a crucial aspect of the 
e problem of the social contract, the 
these problems, political turbulence, and weak economic 
, economic problems are likely to be further 
n environment which is
. The large vacuum left by crowding out the large priva
d quickly. The new regime, in the light of 
obtaining funding and enhancing production 
 (Arab finance) or domestic (depending on 
 "Earlier attempts to strengthen private businesses by pursuing those policies 
-connected insiders, tainting the whole process of reform.
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explicit and 
descent living for the 
.  Young 
’s demands. Such 
tion, overcoming 
 
 more 
te sector 
the worsening 
the military), but 
" See 
 not necessarily in a more efficient
that the private sector in Egypt is 
problems that Saif and Ghoneim (2013) identified 
economic vision, deteriorating security status, inability to determine how policy making and 
decisions are being made in the new regime, frequent change of cabinets, and change of 
several senior government officials who 
community problems. 
 
Keeping aside the ideological political debates 
have from an economic point of view? The answer is a mo
on the past but fixes its problems associated with market failure and ad hoc liberal decisions. 
Advocates of a new system (and they are many) argue that the free market system of the old 
regime is the culprit for all Egyptian ills and call for more
never identified what is meant by that, putting in mind that free market advocates also argue 
for more government involvement. Sometimes they refer to more involvement of the 
government in production of goods and services 
abuse of power by private players), and sometimes they call for better regulations. The scene is 
not clear, and it seems that all are aiming at the same thing but calling it 
other words, the transitional period that Egypt is passing 
difficult and is causing severe economic hardships. 
 
Finally, it is unlikely that there will 
Egypt's economic regime. The socialist elements rooted in the economic system are likely to 
remain for a while. Any regime that governs will be extra cautious 
major market-oriented change that attempts to 
Moreover, the sensitivity of the transitional period and the period that will follow to social 
unrest will imply continuing with high levels of public spending that is not sustainable f
economic point of view. Hence, what is expected is a piece meal market oriented reform to 
avoid social and political unrest. This does not imply that there is a tendency to invoke socialist 
ideals; it is rather a matter of fear from social and/or po
reforms are undertaken. This has been reflected in the initiatives announced by the 
government over the last three years where such initiatives focused on objectives without 
identifying means. The wish list that is o
high sustainable growth rate, increasing GDP per capita, reform of subsidies, etc. But how to 
achieve such objectives has not 
challenges and problems are well known. Remedies are also clearly identified, but what 
lacking is the political economy context that enables the governing regime to start the reforms. 
Given the political economy context Egypt is passing 
big bang approach to  reform 
approach. To be able to achieve significant economic reforms there is a need for building the 
socio-political constituency to undertake the reforms
still non-existent. 
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 way. A recent study (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013)
facing several problems in its ability to function. Among the 
there has been the lack of political and 
are very knowledgeable on how to deal with business 
of the different parties, what alternative do we 
dified free market system
 government involvement. But they 
(to balance the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
through has proven to be extremely 
 
emerge a clear economic system that is able to characterize 
of embarking on any type of 
leapfrog state of affairs to a newer one
litical unrest that may result 
ften mentioned includes very lofty objectives such as 
been clearly identified. To conclude, Egypt’s economic 
through right now, it is 
will be  adopted; it is rather likely to remain a piece meal 
 and to support them
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